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A  two equation  model is  developed  to examine jointly the determinants  of household  food
stamp  program participation  and  program  effects  on  food expenditures.  The model  is unique
in  that  it  postulates  that  the  participation  decision  is  based  on  a  cost-benefit  ratio,  selected
socioeconomic  characteristics,  and  the  potential  for  increasing  both  food and  nonfood  expen-
ditures.  Data from  the  1977-78  USDA  Nationwide  Food  Consumption  Survey  Supplemental
Low Income Sample is used to estimate  the model.  Findings suggest  that households,  in making
the  participation  decision,  place  equal  value  on  the  potential  for  increasing  their  food  and
nonfood  expenditures.  However,  at the  margin, bonus  stamp  income  is  found  to have  more
than twice the impact of money  income on food expenditures.  The model's potential  for policy
analysis  is also examined.
A  fundamental  objective  of  the  Food
Stamp  Program  (FSP)  is  to increase  the
diet quality  of low income households  via
increasing their  food expenditures  to that
of  a reference  standard.  To  achieve  this
goal, eligible  households  choosing to par-
ticipate in the program  are provided  with
an  income  subsidy  in  the  form  of  food
stamps  which  can  only  be spent  on  food
for home consumption.l The  effectiveness
of the program in achieving this goal can,
in. part, be evaluated by analyzing  partic-
ipation  rates of the target population and
the subsequent effect of this in-kind trans-
fer on food expenditures.
David  M.  Smallwood and James  R.  Blaylock  are ag-
ricultural  economists  with the  United  States Depart-
ment  of  Agriculture,  Economic  Research  Service,
National  Economics  Division.  The  views  expressed
in  this  paper  are  not  necessarily  those  of  ERS  or
USDA.
1 Food stamps with several minor exceptions may only
legally  be used to purchase  foods at authorized  "re-
tail food establishments"  which are intended for use
and/or preparation  at home.  Food  stamps may  not
be used to purchase  foods traditionally  referred  to
as  away-from-home  food,  such  as  at fast-food  es-
tablishments  and  restaurants.  Henceforth,  unless
otherwise  specified,  the word  food  will  be used to
denote  food which may  be purchased  with stamps.
Many  microeconomic  analyses  of  the
FSP  have  modeled  the  household's  deci-
sion  to participate  in the  program  sepa-
rately  from the  program's  effect  on  food
expenditures  (Neenan  and  Davis;  Epper-
son  et al.; Huang  et al.; Lane et al.).  In
general,  a single  equation  logit  or  probit
model has been  used to examine the  par-
ticipation  decision  as a function  of house-
hold characteristics  and income. Food ex-
penditures are usually modeled  separately
from the  participation decision  and spec-
ified  as  a  function  of  household  charac-
teristics,  money  income,  bonus  stamp in-
come,  and  an FSP  participation  variable.
The purpose of  this paper  is to develop
and estimate  an  economic  model  of  be-
havior which considers simultaneously the
likelihood  of  participation  by  eligible
households and the effect of program par-
ticipation  on food expenditures.  The pro-
posed model postulates that a household's
decision to participate  in the Food Stamp
Program is influenced  by the potential for
enhancing both  its food  and  nonfood  ex-
penditures.  Although  food  stamps  may
only  legally  be  used  to  purchase  food,
households are afforded an opportunity to
reallocate some money to nonfood use that
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was  previously  allocated  to  food.  The
model disaggregates  net program  benefits
(bonus  food  stamps)  into  these two  com-
ponents  and  allows  each  to  have  poten-
tially  different  effects  on  participation
rates,  and  hence,  household  food  expen-
ditures.  The  model  also  incorporates  a
cost/benefit ratio which measures the rel-
ative  cost  of  program  entry  to  the  total
monetary  benefits  accruing  to household
participation.  Hopefully,  disaggregation
of net program  benefits together  with the
cost/benefit ratio  will allow for improved
estimates  of a  household's  behavioral  re-
sponses  to  FSP  policy  instruments.  Also,
because  the  model  contains  explicit  FSP
policy instruments,  it may be used to sim-
ulate  the  effects  of  proposed  program
changes  on  food  expenditures  and  pro-
gram participation.
The  following  section  contains  the  de-
velopment  of an economic  model  of par-
ticipant  behavior  in  the  FSP.  An  outline
of  the  proposed  statistical  model  is  pre-
sented in the third section. Data and vari-
able  specification  are  discussed  in  the
fourth part. The fifth section contains em-
pirical results and a discussion of their rel-
evance  to  policy  analysis.  A  section  con-
taining  conclusions  and  future  research
directions  concludes the paper.
Theoretical Framework
Prior to elimination  of the purchase  re-
quirement in 1979, the value of the stamps
received, termed the allotment, was based
on  household  size.2 The amount  an  eligi-
ble household was required  to pay for the
2 The  assumption  of a purchase  requirement  is kept
throughout  this discussion because of its importance
as  a  policy  instrument.  The  program  as  it  exists
today can be expressed in this framework by setting
the purchase  requirement  equal  to  zero.  It  should
be  noted  that when  the purchase  requirement  was
eliminated the allotment was decreased  by approx-
imately the same amount  (Stucker  and Boehm).
stamps,  termed  the  purchase  require-
ment,  was  based  on  both  household  size
and  income.  The difference  between the
allotment  and  the purchase  requirement,
termed  the  bonus,  is  the  net  subsidy  or
transfer  of  in-kind  income  to the  house-
hold.
A  conventional  economic  model  of
household  behavior  as  developed  by
Southworth  and advanced  by Mittelham-
mer  and  West;  Clarkson;  Huang  et  al.,
and others provides the conceptual frame-
work  for  this  study.3 Since  this  model  is
well  known,  only  the  highlights  will  be
presented  here.  Briefly,  participant  be-
havior  is  modeled  within  the  classical
household  utility  maximizing  framework
of  demand  theory  and  incorporates  a
modified  income  constraint  to  allow  for
the in-kind  provisions  of the FSP.  Within
this framework,  the household  is assumed
to  maximize  utility  subject  to  a  budget
constraint  which  is  determined,  in  part,
by FSP participation  and program  rules.
The above model implies that the effect
of  bonus  stamps  on food  expenditures  is
identical to that of money income for those
households that spend more than their al-
lotment  of stamps on food at home.  Only
in  the  case  where  the  allotment  exceeds
desired  food expenditures  is the  effect of
the  FSP  on  food  expenditures  hypothe-
sized to be larger than that of a cash trans-
fer.  Empirically,  the  number  of  house-
holds  in  this  latter  group  appears  to  be
limited. Food expenditure data for partic-
ipating  and  eligible  nonparticipating
households contained in the supplemental
3Household  income  has  traditionally  been  consid-
ered  exogenous  in  FSP  models.  While  the authors
believe  that  the  labor  supply  effects  of  the  Food
Stamp  Program  are  important,  especially  when
considered  jointly with  other means-tested  welfare
programs,  such as  Aid  to Families with  Dependent
Children,  they are beyond  the  scope  of this  study.
For an  excellent  review of the  literature  on the  la-
bor  supply  effects  of  means-tested  transfer  pro-
grams,  see Danziger  et al.
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low-income sample  to the  1977-78 USDA
Nationwide  Food  Consumption  Survey
reveals  that the  average  weekly  food  ex-
penditures  exceeded  the  average  weekly
allotment  by more than $7 per household
and  that  less  than  5%  of  the  households
participate  in  the  program  on  a  partial
basis  (i.e.,  purchase  less than  the  full  al-
lotment).  Thus, few households appear to
be constrained  by  the allotment.
The hypothesis that bonus food stamps
affect food expenditures the same as mon-
ey income is generated from  a model that
simplifies from the complexities  of actual
budgeting decisions  in  low income  house-
holds.  West  and  Price  found  the  house-
hold  budgeting  process  to be quite  com-
plex  with  the  marginal  propensities  to
spend  (MPS)  on  food differing  by  source
of income.  In  addition,  virtually  all  em-
pirical  studies of the FSP have  found  the
MPS  for food  out  of bonus  income  to be
two  to three times the size of the MPS  for
food out of cash income  (West and  Price;
Benus  et al.; Neenan  and  Davis;  Huang
et al.; Chen and  Johnson; Johnson et al.).
Several  possible  explanations  for  more
complex  spending  behavior  than  is  im-
plied  by  the  conventional  model  come
readily  to  mind.  First,  a  household's  re-
ported income  (i.e., last month's)  may not
accurately  portray  the household's  finan-
cial  status  relevant  to  this  month's  food
purchases.  Transitory  income  fluctuations
embodied  in reported  income  may  cause
a systematic bias to occur in the estimated
money  income  and  bonus  income  re-
sponse  parameters  (Friedman).  Second,
food stamp  coupons  may  facilitate  finan-
cial  management  and  budgeting  in  low
income  households.  For  example,  food
stamp households  cannot be pressured  by
bill  collectors  to  pay  their  financial  obli-
gations  with  stamps.  Third,  low-income
households  may  be hedonistic  in their  fi-
nancial  planning  like  that which  is  com-
monly  observed  with  enlisted  military
personnel.  That is, they spend their mon-
ey and stamps today and heavily  discount
the  value  of  future  consumption.  Conse-
quently, if all stamps are used early in the
month,  the  household  may  use  periodic
cash receipts to supplement food purchas-
es  at the  end  of the month.  Due to these
and other possibilities,  it is important that
a true statistical evaluation  of the theoret-
ical  model allow for potential differences
between  the effects  of bonus income  and
money income  on food expenditures.  It is
then possible to statistically test the valid-
ity of the theoretical  model.
A household's decision  to enter the FSP
is  based  on  expected  costs  and  benefits.
The major benefit derived from FSP par-
ticipation  is  the  in-kind  income  transfer
associated with the bonus food stamps (i.e.,
the value of the food stamp allotment  less
the  purchase  requirement).  This  increase
in  income,  while  in  the  form  of  food
stamps,  may  free-up  income  previously
allocated to food  and thus enable partici-
pating  households  to  increase  both  food
and  nonfood  expenditures.  To the  extent
that  stamps  are  less  fungible  than  cash,
households may place differing values on
bonus stamps in terms of the participa-
tion decision. That is,  eligible households
may place  different  values  on  the poten-
tial  for increasing  food  expenditures  ver-
sus  the  potential  for  increasing  nonfood
expenditures depending upon their ability
to  allocate  the  in-kind  income  as  they
would  cash.
Another economic factor associated with
program  participation  is  measured  by  a
cost/benefit  ratio.  This  is  defined  as  the
ratio of the purchase requirement to the
allotment. The  purchase  requirement
measures  the  direct  financial  outlays  re-
quired for program  participation  and the
allotment  represents  the  gross  benefits  of
participation.  While it  would  also  be de-
sirable  to  include  indirect  costs  incurred
in  program  participation,  such  as  time,
gasoline, child care,  and the psychic costs
of program stigma, these are not included
43
Smallwood and BlaylockeWestern Journal of Agricultural Economics
due  to data  limitations.4 While  not  mod-
eled  formally,  other studies  have  pointed
to the purchase requirement  as a substan-
tial deterrent to program participation for
many  households  (Rungeling  and  Smith;
Epperson  et  al.;  Searce  et  al.;  Love). 5
Many  economic  models  of  the  FSP  em-
phasize  the  net  benefits  of  participation
(i.e.,  the  bonus)  and  choose  to ignore  fi-
nancial  problems  that  households  may
have in collecting the required cash need-
ed to purchase  a month's worth of stamps.
The  allocation  of scarce  cash resources to
purchase  food  stamps  may  reduce  sub-
stantially  the  liquidity  of  an  already
"poor"  household.  Thus, by participating
in  the  program  a  household  could  place
itself at considerable  risk to unanticipated
financial  obligations,  even  if  only  on  a
temporary  basis.  The  cost/benefit  ratio
represents  a balance between the  relative
costs  and  benefits  of  program  participa-
tion. Another similar interpretation is that
it represents  the  price of participation  in
the sense  that  it  measures the  direct  cost
per dollar  of the food stamp  allotment.
Disaggregation  of  bonus  income  into
food  and  nonfood  expenditure  compo-
nents  allows  one  to  examine  separately
their  effects  on FSP  participation.  Under
a  pure  income  transfer  program,  one
would  expect  a household  to allocate  ad-
ditional  income  between  food  and  non-
food so as to obtain equal benefit from the
marginal  food  and  nonfood  dollar.  Oth-
erwise,  the  household  could  always  real-
locate  expenditures  towards  the  more
highly  valued  item.  Conversely,  an  "ef-
fective"  food  oriented  program  from  so-
4 To the extent that stigma and other important "cost"
variables  are correlated  with  variables  included  in
the  model,  their  effects  will  be  confounded  with
other  effects  attributed  to  these  variables.  Conse-
quently,  our reported  parameter  estimates  may  in-
clude an  effect for stigma.
5Approximately  17  percent  of the  eligible  nonpar-
ticipating  households  in  the  sample  used  in  this
study,  said  they  weren't  participating  because  "it
cost too much."
ciety's viewpoint may be thought of as one
in  which  a  household's  consumption  op-
portunities and/or purchase  incentives are
enhanced  primarily  in  the  direction  of
more  food  (Thurow).  Under  a  food  ori-
ented  program,  a  household's  consump-
tion  opportunities  are  more  limited  than
that of  a pure income  transfer and  possi-
bly  less  preferred  from  the  household's
viewpoint.  Thus,  with  a  food  oriented
program the implicit value of the margin-
al food dollar may be  less than that of the
marginal  nonfood  dollar  and  the  subse-
quent influence  of the stamps on a house-
hold's  decision  to participate  in  the  FSP
may  be  less  than  that  of  a  pure  income
transfer.
In the following  section  a simultaneous
equations model of FSP participation  and
food expenditures  is developed  which in-
corporates  the  above  enhancement  and
cost-benefit hypotheses.
Statistical Model
Based on the preceeding theoretical dis-
cussion,  a  two  equation  statistical  model
of a household's behavioral response to the
Food  Stamp  Program  is  proposed.  One
equation  is  used  to  model  a  household's
decision to participate in the FSP and the
other is  used to model  a household's  food
expenditure  response.  The model  and  its
development  follows  closely  the  pioneer-
ing work of Schmidt in his analysis  of the
impact  of unions on wage  rates.
The expected dollar value of bonus food
stamps  represents  the  most  obvious  eco-
nomic benefit to participating households.
However,  as  discussed  above,  the  value
households place on the bonus stamps will
depend  on  restrictions  that  the  stamps
place on their ability to allocate resources.
Consequently,  one  must estimate  the  in-
fluence  of  the  program  on  spending  be-
havior.  The  food  expenditure  enhance-
ment (FEE) is estimated  as the difference
between food expenditures conditioned  on
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being  in the program  versus being out  of
the  program.  The  nonfood  expenditure
enhancement  (NEE) is then calculated  as
a residual: the expected dollar bonus  less
the  food  expenditure  enhancement.  As-
suming  that  the  marginal  propensity  to
spend  on  food  out  of  bonus  income  lies
between 0 and 1, both FEE and NEE will
be non-negative.
Mathematically,  the food  expenditure-
FSP participation model can be expressed
for each household  i as:
P(D,  = 1) log p(D  1)  =  Qi5  + a,(FEE,)  + a2(NEEi)
+ a3(PRj/ALLOTi)  (1)
FE,/F  =  ZiP + (DiX,)y  + e,
i =  (1 . ..N),  e  ~ N(O,  a2)  (2)
where
P:  denotes  the probability  of an
event;
Di:  participation in the FSP; Di =1
if  household  participates,
zero otherwise;
Qi:  row vector  of socioeconomic
variables;
6:  column vector of parameters;
a1,  a2, a3:  scalar  parameters;
FE,:  food expenditures;
FEEi:  food  expenditure  enhance-
ment,  FiXiyi;
NEEi:  nonfood  expenditure  en-
hancement,  EBi - FEEi;
Fi:  household size;
EBi:  expected  bonus;
PRi:  purchase requirement
ALLOTi:  allotment
Zi:  row  vector  of  explanatory
variables;
3:  column vector of parameters:
(DiXi):  row  vector  of  interactions
found by multiplying a vec-
tor of exogenous variables Xi
by  the  scalar  participation
dummy  Di;
y:  column vector of parameters;
ei:  normally  distributed  error
term  with  zero  mean,  con-
stant variance,  and assumed
independent  of Di and  Zi;
and Qi and  Xi may be  subsets of the vari-
ables in Zi.
The  household  food  expenditure  en-
hancement  (i.e.,  the  difference  between
per capita food expenditure conditional  on
participation  times household size) can be
derived from equation  (2)  as follows:
FEE,  = [(FEi I  Di =  1) - (FE  I  Di = 0)]
= [(ZiP  + Xiy + e)  - (ZiP + ei)]Fi
=  FiXiy.
(3)
The value of FiXi,  corresponds  to the food
expenditure  enhancement  (FEE)  portion
of the bonus in equation (1). The expected
bonus  minus  FiXiy  is  the  potential  in-
crease  in nonfood  expenditure  (NEE)  as-
sociated  with  program  participation  in
equation  (2).
Estimation  requires  the  independence
of ei and Di. This appears to be reasonable
in  the present  context  since  participation
is  modeled  as a function  of the food  and
nonfood  expenditure  differentials  rather
than the  level of expenditures.  The error
term  in  the  expenditure  equation  is  as-
sumed  to  be  the  same  for  a  household
whether  or not it participates  in the Food
Stamp Program; hence, it cancels out when
the differential is calculated as in equation
(3) above.  Consequently,  ei does not affect
the determination of  Di, and the indepen-
dence  of  Di  and  ei, although  Di  is endog-
enous,  is  a  reasonable  assumption
(Schmidt).
The food expenditure  equation  is spec-
ified  on a per capita basis. This allows one
to  interpret  the  effects  of  dummy  vari-
ables on regional  location,  race, and other
factors  as  being an  expenditure  differen-
tial associated  with an individual.  For ex-
ample,  the household  effect  of race  on  a
two  member  household  is  twice  as  large
as for  a one member  household.  This  ap-
pears  more  reasonable  than  the  assump-
tion  of  a  constant  differential  per  house-
hold independent  of its size because  it also
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allows  the  effects  of  the  other  variables,
including the Food Stamp Program, to dif-
fer  by household  size.6 Also,  the  per per-
son  expenditure  equation  may  easily  be
interpreted  as  a  household  equation  by
multiplying  through by  household size.
Two testable hypotheses  follow directly
from  the  conventional  economic  model.
First,  if  the  influence  of  bonus  stamp
income  is  equivalent  to  that  of  money
income,  the model  predicts that the mar-
ginal  effect  of enhanced  nonfood  expen-
ditures on  participation  is the same  as the
marginal  effect  of enhanced  food expen-
ditures.  Thus,  one  hypothesis  is  that a,
a2 in the  participation  equation.  Second,
the theory  implies that the marginal  pro-
pensity  to  spend  on  food  out  of  money
income is equal to that out of bonus stamp
income. That is, the coefficients  on money
income  and  bonus  income  in  the  expen-
diture  equation  are  equal.  Alternatively,
under an effective  food-oriented  program
individuals would be forced to spend more
on food than they otherwise  would if giv-
en cash resources.  Thus, from the margin-
al  conditions  of  consumer  demand,  this
implies  that  the  marginal  food  dollar
would be less preferred than the marginal
nonfood dollar, and  consequently, a, < a2
in the participation  equation.  Also,  an ef-
fective food oriented  program  would  im-
ply that the marginal  propensity to spend
on  food out of bonus income  exceeds that
'out  of money  income  in the food  expen-
diture equation.
Efficient  parameter  estimators  for  the
model  can  be obtained  by the  method of
maximum  liklihood  and  consistent,  al-
though not generally  efficient,  estimators,
may be obtained by a recursive procedure
(Schmidt).  The  latter  procedure  consists
first of  OLS estimation  of the expenditure
6  In  addition,  heteroscedasticity  in  the  error  term
which  is  commonly  observed  in household  expen-
diture models  is often mitigated  in per capita spec-
ifications.
equation.  Next, the food and nonfood  ex-
penditure  enhancements  associated  with
program participation  are calculated from
the  OLS  parameters  and  the  relevant
characteristics  of each household. The dif-
ferentials are then entered into the partic-
ipation  equation  which  is  estimated  via
the logit  procedure.  These  recursive  esti-
mators  are  consistent  but  not  asymptoti-
cally efficient unless a, =  a2. In the special
case of  a, = a 2, one  can  combine  the two
endogenous  components,  FEE and  NEE,
to form the expected  bonus.  Since the ex-
pected  bonus  is  predetermined,  the  two
equations  can  be estimated  independent-
ly.7  In the  case  where  a1 =  a2 the  consis-
tent estimates are useful  as starting values
for  the  more  complex  maximum  likeli-
hood  estimators.
Data
Data for  the analysis  of FSP participa-
tion  and  food  expenditures  are  obtained
from  computer  tapes  of  the  1977-78
USDA  Nationwide  Food  Consumption
Survey,  Low Income  Supplemental  Sam-
ple  (NFCS-LI).8 The NFCS-LI  data were
collected  between  November  1977  and
March  1978  from a representative sample
of  approximately  4,500  low  income
households deemed  eligible  for  the  Food
Stamp  Program.  Approximately  41  per-
cent  of the  sample  households  were  par-
ticipating  in the Food Stamp  Program.
Information  on  household  characteris-
tics and food use was obtained during per-
sonal interviews with the household mem-
ber(s)  most responsible  for food  planning
and  preparation.  The  sample  households
were contacted at least one-week  prior  to
7 Of  course,  one  cannot  be  sure  that  a, = a2 until
simultaneous  estimation of the  system  is complete.
8 Public use tapes of the 1977-78 NFCS are available
from National  Technical Information  Service,  U.S.
Department  of Commerce.
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the interview  and  asked  to keep  unstruc-
tured  notes  on household  food usage  and
costs.  During  the  actual  interview  a  de-
tailed food list was used to assist the home-
maker  to recall  the kinds,  quantities, and
values  of foods  used  from  home  supplies
during the last  7  days.  The recall data  on
the  total money  value  of purchased  food
used  (less alcoholic beverages)  provides the
basis  for this  study.  The money  value  of
alcoholic  beverages  and  nonpurchased
food are excluded  from the analysis since
they  cannot  be  directly  purchased  with
stamps.
Household  food  expenditures  are  pos-
tulated  to be a function of region  and ur-
ban location of household residence,  race,
number  of guest meals  served,  household
money  income,  and  whether  the  house-
hold  receives  reduced  or  free  school
lunches.  These  variables  are  typical  of
those used  in similar types  of expenditure
equations  and,  hence,  will  not  be  elabo-
rated upon.  The  effects  of household  age
composition are accounted  for by  includ-
ing the proportion  of household members
in  specified  age  groups.  This  approach
may be viewed as a pragmatic  alternative
to a  theoretically pure adult equivalent
scale specification. To allow for slope and
intercept  changes  between  participants
and nonparticipants,  the above  variables,
bonus income,  and a unit vector  (to allow
for a change in the intercept)  were inter-
acted with the dummy  participation  vari-
able.  Only bonus income, the North  Cen-
tral  region,  urbanization,  and  variables
representing  the  presence  of infants  and
the elderly  were  found  to  be  statistically
significant.
The  decision  to participate  in  the  FSP
is  postulated  to  be  influenced  by  region
and  urban  location  of  household  resi-
dence,  home  ownership,  race,  employ-
ment status  of male and/or  female  head,
education  level  of  household  head,  pres-
ence of person(s)  over  65 years old in the
household,  presence  of  only  a  female
household  head, a participation cost/ben-
efit ratio, and the potential food and  non-
food  expenditure  enhancements.  The  lo-
cation of household residence variables are
not  of direct  interest  but are  included  in
the model to adjust for environmental and
related  factors  which are not  directly  ob-
servable.
Home  ownership  is expected  to  have a
negative  influence  on  participation.
Households  which  own  homes  will  gen-
erally  have both  higher assets  and future
income  streams  than  similar  non  home-
owning  households,  hence,  the  need  to
supplement  food  expenditures  via  pro-
gram  entry is diminished.
Sex,  age, education,  race,  and  employ-
ment status of the household head, as well
as the presence of both a male and female
head,  measure  characteristics  of  individ-
uals in the household  that are expected to
be related to the household's  employment
opportunities,  earning  potential  and  per-
manent income. Epperson  et al. and Lane
et al. found  that money  income  was neg-
atively related to FSP participation.  Con-
sequently,  the effect of these variables  on
participation  is  hypothesized  to  be  in-
versely  related to their effect  on  income.
The cost/benefit  ratio  is expected  to be
negatively  related to participation.  Higher
costs  of program  entry relative  to expect-
ed  benefits make  the program  less attrac-
tive  to eligible  households.
Both the food and nonfood differentials
should  be  positively  related  to  program
entry as both variables essentially relate to
program  benefits.  The  higher  the  poten-
tial benefits  to participation the greater  is
the probability  a household  will enter the
FSP.
The  actual  variables  utilized  in  the
analysis  are  described  in  Table  1.  The
variables  corresponding  to the vectors  Qi,
Xi,  and  Zi  are detailed  in the same  table.
The actual sample size used in the analysis
is 3,852.  The loss in observations  from the
original  sample  is  due  largely  to  missing
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TABLE  1.  Definitions of Model  Variables.
Included in Vector
Label  Qj  Zj  Xj  Definition
v  NC  = 1 if household  resides in North  Central;  zero otherwise
S = 1 if household  resides in South;  zero otherwise
W =  1 if household  resides in West;  zero otherwise
U =  1 if household resides in an SMSA suburban  area;  zero other-
wise
HO =  1 if household owns a home;  zero otherwise
R =  1 if household head is black; zero otherwise
D =  1 if household received food stamps last month and this month;
zero otherwise
Number of guest meals
SLR =  1 if household had  school lunches at reduced prices; zero oth-
erwise
Food expenditure  enhancement
Nonfood  expenditure enhancement
Dollar value per  person of purchased food used from home supplies
in a week
EM  = 1 if household has an employed male  head;  zero otherwise
EF = 1 if household has  an employed female head;  zero otherwise
FH = 1 if household has a female  head and no  male head;  zero other-
wise
E = 1 if household  head  is at least a high  school graduate; zero oth-
erwise
v  Proportion of household composed  of members under age 3
Proportion of household composed  of members of age 3 to 12
Proportion of household composed  of members of age 13 to 19
Proportion of household composed  of members of age  20 to 39
v  Proportion of household composed  of members  of age  65 or older
Last month's household income in dollars on a weekly  per person ba-
sis
v  Expected weekly bonus value of food stamps to eligible households
regardless of whether  they participate
ELD = 1 if male or female household head is  65 years or older;  zero
otherwise
Expected weekly  purchase requirement  divided by expected  weekly
allotment
data  on  income  and  reporting  errors  in
food stamp information.
Empirical Results
Due to  cost  considerations,  the  statisti-
cally  consistent  recursive  estimator  men-
tioned above was used during preliminary
model  selection.  Parameter  estimates  for
the selected  model  were  found  to be  ro-
bust  to the  entry and exit  of other  socio-
economic  variables  considered.  Subse-
quently,  these  parameter  estimates  were
used  as  starting  values  in  obtaining  the
maximum  liklihood  estimates reported  in
Table 2.  Estimates obtained from the two
procedures  were  found  to  be  virtually
identical.
Results from the estimated  expenditure
equation  reveal  that  urbanization  and
geographic region of household residence,
size  and  age  composition  of  the  house-
hold, number of guest meals served, race,
number  of reduced  price  and  free school
lunches, money income, and participation
in the Food  Stamp Program  were  signifi-
cant determinants  of the level of food ex-
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weekly  food  expenditures  were  found  to
be  highest  in  the  Northeast  region  and
lowest in the South.  Blacks were found to
spend more per person on food from home
supplies than nonblacks.  Whether  this lat-
ter result  is due to underlying racial influ-
ences  on  the types  and quantities  of  food
purchased  is  unknown.  As  would  be  ex-
pected,  food expenditures  increased  with
the number of guest meals  served.
Households with children  receiving  re-
duced or free school lunches spent less than
their  counterparts  not  receiving  the
lunches.  This  is  consistent  with  the  hy-
pothesis  that government subsidized  meals
substitute, at least partially,  for meals that
would  otherwise  have been  purchased  by
the household.
The  estimated  marginal  propensity  to
spend (MPS) on food out of bonus income
was  over twice as large as  that for money
income  and  the  two  coefficients  were
found  to  be  statistically  different  at  the
0.05 level. The MPS on food out of money
income was about 9.9 cents per dollar and
the  corresponding  MPS  out  of  bonus  in-
come was approximately  23 cents per dol-
lar.  The above  indicates that one can  re-
ject  the  hypothesis  generated  from  the
traditional economic  model that bonus in-
come  is  allocated  the  same  as  money  in-
come.
In  addition  to  the  estimated  effect  of
bonus  income  on  food  expenditures,  an
additional  program  participation  effect
was  found  which  varies  with  region  and
urban locations of household residence and
age  of  household  members.  The  partici-
pation  effect  on  food  expenditures  was
found to be significantly  larger for house-
hold  members  under  three  and  those  65
and older than for those of other ages. For
example, holding bonus income and other
factors  constant,  the  participation  effect
increased  food  expenditures  $3.14
($2.9435  + $0.1981)  weekly for each child
under  3  years  and  $1.72  ($1.5218  +
$0.1981)  weekly  for  each  adult  65  years
or older compared  with the participation
TABLE 2. Asymptotically Efficient Estimates
of FSP  Participation and  Food  Ex-
penditure Model.
Participation Equation
Variable  Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient
Constant  1.2639  FH  0.5774
(0.2491)  (0.0880)
NC  -0.8101  E  -0.3996
(0.1777)  (0.0933)
S  -1.2395  ELD  -0.3417
(0.1443)  (0.198)
W  -1.1639  R  0.3201
(0.1841)  (0.0816)
U  -0.4246  PR/  -1.4477
(0.1245)  ALLOT  (0.3564)
HO  -0.6589  FEE  0.0265
(0.0832)  (0.0161)




Variable  Food  Expenditure  Equation
Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient
Constant  11.4846  P3/F  2.3751
(0.5574)  (0.6594)
NC  -0.9760  P4/F  -0.6411
(0.5025)  (0.5117)
S  -1.4548  P5/F  -2.3494
(0.3625)  (0.3701)
W  -0.5524  Y/F  0.0991
(0.4760)  (0.0082)
U  -0.1346  D  0.1981
(0.3250)  (0.7782)
SLR  -0.9754  (EB/F)*D  0.2328
(0.3250)  (0.1098)
R  1.0271  NC*D  0.9501
(0.2070)  (0.6021)
GM/F  1.2453  U*D  -0.9600
(0.1015)  (0.5689)
P1/F  -7.8727  (P1/F)*D  2.9435
(1.2201)  (1.6894)
P2/F  -3.4046  (P5/F)*D  1.5218
(0.6600)  (0.5393)
Note: Asymptotic standard  errors in parentheses.
effect  for the  base  group  (all other  ages)
of  approximately  $0.20  per  person  per
week. Consequently, the program appears
to  increase  food  expenditures  most  for
those  population  subsets  often  identified
49
Smallwood and BlaylockWestern Journal of Agricultural  Economics
TABLE  3.  Effects  of  a 1-Unit Change  in the
Independent  Variables  on  the
Probability of FSP  Participation by
Eligible Households. a
Change in
Independent Variable  Probability
Region
North Central  -0.1713
South  -0.2955
West  -0.2265
SMSA,  non central city  -0.0953
Home ownership  -0.1509
Race  0.0750
Female  head only  0.1344
Female head works  -0.2167
Male head works  -0.2974
Elderly head  -0.0788
Education of meal planner  -0.0909
Cost-benefit ratiob  -0.0032
Expected  bonus stamps  0.0060
a The effects of changes in the independent  variables
are computed  from the estimated participation equa-
tion evaluated at the mean values of the independent
variables.
b A unit change in the cost-benefit  ratio is  assumed  to
be a 1-percentage  point change.
as  most  in  need  of  public  assistance  (i.e.,
the elderly and  infants). 9
Most  coefficients  estimated  in the  par-
ticipation  equation  were  statistically  sig-
nificant at the usual confidence levels with
the signs  as expected  a priori. The model
correctly  classifies  72.6 percent  of the ob-
servations  using the (0.5,  0.5) criteria.  For
this criterion, a correct classification means
that  the  predicted  probability  equals  or
exceeds  0.5  for  participating  households
9 An expenditure  equation similar  to the  one  above,
except  that  interactions  between  household  age
composition,  region,  urbanization,  and FSP  partic-
ipation  were  excluded,  was  estimated.  The  result
was  to  increase  the  effect  attributed  to  bonus  in-
come to about 3 times the effect of  money income
(i.e., an MPS for money income of 0.10 and an MPS
for bonus  income of 0.32).  This latter result  is con-
sistent with some earlier studies (Neenan and Davis;
West and  Price)  which also omitted the interaction
effects  but  is misleading  as  the model  omits  statis-
tically  relevant variables  which are correlated with
the included variables.  The net effect  is to attribute
effects  to bonus income which  should be attributed
to other  variables.
TABLE  4. Effect  on  the  Probability  of  FSP
Participation Given Changes  in  the
Purchase  Requirement.a
Pur-  Proba-
chase  Bonus  Value  bility of
Require-  Allot-  Partici-
ment  ment  Total  FEE  NEE  pation
0  32  32  9.93  22.07  0.61
5  32  27  8.74  18.26  0.53
13b  32
b 19  6.83  12.17  0.39
18  32  14  5.63  8.37  0.31
25  32  7  3.96  3.04  0.21
................................................................................................................................
0  19  19  6.83  12.17  0.53
aAll  variables  except  the  weekly  purchase  require-
ment,  allotment,  and expected  bonus are  evaluated
at the sample means.
b Sample  means  of allotment  and  purchase  require-
ment rounded  up.
or is below 0.5 for nonparticipating  house-
holds.
The estimated  effects  of  the  indepen-
dent  variables  on  the  probability  of  FSP
participation  are  reported  in  Table  3.
Variables,  other  than  the  one  being  ex-
amined,  are held constant at their respec-
tive  sample  means.  For  example,  the
probability  of  FSP  participation  in  the
Northeast  (omitted  base)  region  ranges
from  17  to 30 percentage points higher at
the sample means  than in the other  three
regions.  The  probability  of  participation
was  lowest  in  the  South  followed  by  the
West and  North Central  regions.
Households  residing  in  the  suburban
portion of an SMSA were found less  likely
to  participate  in  the  program.  These
households  had  a  probability  of  partici-
pation approximately  10 percentage points
less than other households.  Eligible house-
holds  which  don't  own  a  home  had  a
probability  of  participation  that  was  15
percentage  points higher  than  for  home-
owners.  Black  households  were about 7 to
8 percentage  points more likely  to partic-
ipate  than  similar  nonblack  households.
Households with only a female  head were
13  percentage  points more  likely  to par-
ticipate than  other  similar  households.  A
working  male  or  female  head  of  house-
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hold  was  associated  with  a  reduction  in
the probability of FSP participation  rang-
ing from 22  to 30  percentage  points  over
households  with  unemployed  heads.
Households  with  an  elderly  head  were
about  8  percent  less  likely  to participate
than  similar nonelderly  households.  Also,
households  in  which  the  primary  meal
planner  had  completed  high school  were
10 percent  less likely  to participate in the
FSP  than  similar  households  where  the
meal planner  has less education.
The  cost/benefit  ratio  was  negatively
related  to  participation,  as  expected. 1 0 A
10 percent increase in the cost/benefit ra-
tio  was  asociated  with  a  3.2  percentage
point decline  in the likelihood  of  partici-
pation at the sample means. This indicates
that  as  the  purchase  requirement  is  de-
creased (with the allotment held constant)
participation  would  be  expected  to  in-
crease.  Consequently,  the  purchase  re-
quirement may be viewed as a significant
deterrent  to participation.
The  effects  of  the  potential  food  and
nonfood  expenditure  enhancements  on
FSP  participation  were  found  to  be  vir-
tually identical and a statistical test for the
equality  of a, and  a2 was  not  rejected  at
the .05 level. This implies that households,
in deciding whether  or not to participate
in the  FSP, place  equal  value  on the  po-
tentials  for  increasing  food  and  nonfood
spending.  However, as shown above, those
households  that actually  decide  to partic-
ipate  appear  to  allocate  bonus  income
more  towards  food  expenditures  than
would  be  predicted  via  an  equivalent
10  A  purchase  requirement  to  income ratio  variable
was tried as an alternative to the purchase  require-
ment  to  allotment  ratio  in  a  preliminary  model
specification.  However,  all  specifications  that  in-
cluded  an income  term  gave  problems  due  to the
close functional relationship between the FSP vari-
ables  and  income.  Because  we  thought  that  pro-
gram  benefits  were  more  important  to  participa-
tion than the potential effect of declining marginal
utility of income,  we chose  not  to include  income
terms.
amount  of money income.  Consequently,
the  fact that potential  benefits  are in the
form  of food stamps rather than cash does
not  appear  to  be  a  deterrent  to  partici-
pation although  the bonus stamp  benefits
are allocated  differently  than  the  money
income. Furthermore,  this result (a, = a,)
is of particular  importance because  it im-
plies  that  the  two-equation  system  need
not be estimated simultaneously  and that
a simpler model which combines the food
and  nonfood  expenditure  enhancements
into the expected  bonus provides  efficient
parameter estimates. Also, as shown in Ta-
ble  3,  a  $10  increase  in  the  expected
weekly bonus  stamps was associated  with
a  6 percentage  point increase  in the  like-
lihood of program  participation.
The model can be used to  simulate the
effects of  policy instruments  on the prob-
ability  of  participation  and  the  subse-
quent effect on the food and  nonfood en-
hancements. The major policy  instruments
by  which  administrators  can  influence
participation  and  food  expenditures  are
the allowable deductions from  income, the
purchase requirement,  asset limits, and the
allotment amount.  Changes  in asset limits
and  allowable  income  deductions  have
been the primary  policy instruments used.
Since  the  purchase  requirement  is  deter-
mined  by household  size,  income, and al-
lowable income deductions, changes in in-
come  and  allowable  income  deductions
can be viewed within our model  as direct
changes in the purchase requirement. This,
in  turn,  will  influence  bonus  stamp  in-
come and the  cost-benefit  ratio.
Presented in  Table  4 are  the results  of
alternate  scenarios involving hypothetical
changes in the purchase requirement.  For
example,  if the  purchase  requirement  is
eliminated  and  all other  exogenous  vari-
ables  including  the  allotment  are  evalu-
ated at their sample  means, the  probabil-
ity of participation  increases  from 0.39  to
0.61.  In  addition, the  household's  weekly
food  and  nonfood  expenditure  enhance-
ments  increase  from  $6.83 and  $12.17  to
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$9.93 and $22.07,  respectively,  under this
scenario.  Conversely,  increasing  the  pur-
chase  requirement  or  decreasing  the  al-
lowable  income  deductions  decreases  bo-
nus  income,  the  food  and  nonfood
expenditure  enhancements,  and the prob-
ability  of participation.  Also  presented  in
Table  4  are the  results  of  simultaneously
eliminating the purchase requirement and
reducing the allotment by the same dollar
amount. This scenario is similar to the leg-
islated  removal  of  the  purchase  require-
ment in January  1979. Our simulations in-
dicate  that  eliminating  the  purchase
requirement would increase the probabil-
ity of participation by 14 percentage points
from the base probability calculated at the
sample  means  of  all  variables.  Assuming
no change  in the  eligible population,  this
implies  a 36-percent  increase  in program
enrollment.  Actual  FSP  enrollment  in-
creased  17.9 percent and 15.9 percent, re-
spectively,  in the  two calendar  years fol-
lowing  the  elimination  of  the  purchase
requirement  (EPR).  Of course, actual en-
rollment growth during this time was par-
tially due to an increase  in eligible house-
holds caused by poor economic  conditions.
In summary, while  regulations  governing
net transfers  per household  changed  only
modestly with elimination of the purchase
requirement,  total program  cost increased
substantially due to increased enrollment.
Conclusions
An  economic  model  of  household  be-
havior  was  developed  to  analyze  the  ef-
fects  of  FSP  policy  control  variables  on
food  expenditures  and  program  partici-
pation  rates.  The  model  postulated  that
FSP  participation  by  eligible  households
is  determined,  in  part,  by  the  opportu-
nities households  have and choices house-
holds  make  with  regard  to the  allocation
of their in-kind income  transfer.  The op-
portunities  to enhance  food  and  nonfood
spending  via  program  participation  and
receipt of bonus stamp income were found
to have  the same  effects  on program  par-
ticipation.  In  the  context  of  our  model,
this finding implies  that the  participation
decision can be considered independently
of  the  allocation  of  both  money  income
and  food  stamps  to  food  and  nonfood
items.  Thus, there  was  no indication  that
households  with a  greater  preference  for
food  (larger  food  expenditure  enhance-
ment) were more likely to participate than
other households.
Statistical  tests  revealed  that  the  level
of expected bonus stamp income has a sig-
nificant  positive  influence  on  the  proba-
bility  of  program  participation.  For  ex-
ample, a $10 increase in expected  weekly
bonus  stamp  income  was  found  to  in-
crease the  probability  of participation  by
approximately  6  percentage  points.  Also,
additional bonus stamp income was found
to have more than twice the effect on food
spending  as  additional  money  income.
This  suggests  that replacing  stamps  with
cash would  be substantially  less  effective
as a food  enhancing  program.
Food  expenditure  differentials  associ-
ated  with  FSP  participation  were  found
to  be  larger  for  households  with  elderly
persons  or  infants  present.  Whether  this
effect  is due to pure program  effects or to
the  type  of  household  self-selecting  into
the program is not clear.  Some simple tests
for sample selection bias using Heckman's
procedure did not indicate its presence for
this sample.  In any  case, these  household
types  appear  to  benefit  more  from  FSP
participation  in  terms  of  increased  food
expenditures  than others.
The  cost-benefit  ratio  associated  with
participation,  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the
expected purchase  requirement to the al-
lotment, was found to be a significant fac-
tor  influencing  participation.  Program
participation  was  found  to decline  mark-
edly  as  the  cost-benefit  ratio  was  in-
creased.  Since the most  needy households
tend to have lower cost-benefit  ratios, this
result  suggests  that  policy  instruments
which  influence this  ratio can  be used as
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effective  tools  to  control  program  cost
while  minimizing  the  deleterious  effects
of program budget reductions. That is, the
purchase requirement,  if re-enacted,  could
be  used  as  a  policy  instrument  to  limit
participation  of  "marginal"  households
without  further  restricting  the  eligibility
requirements  or reducing the net transfer
of  benefits  per  household.  In  this  sense,
the purchase requirement  may be a polit-
ically acceptable  means of controlling  the
FSP budget.
These  empirical findings  together  with
those  of  Clarkson,  Huang  et  al.,  Mittel-
hammer and  West, and many others sug-
gest that the traditional indifference curve
model  of consumer behavior  used to ana-
lyze the FSP does  not adequately  explain
the  effects  of  FSP  on  food  spending.  To
better  understand  the  determinants  of
program participation and the program ef-
fects on food spending and nutritional ad-
equacy,  improved  economic  models  will
have to be developed.  Future research ef-
forts on  theoretical  modeling  will proba-
bly be  most  fruitful in  the  area  of mod-
eling  the  income  constraint  and  those
factors  related  to  financial  management
and  resource  allocation  in  low  income
households.  Lastly, we offer  our results  in
hope that this research may  stimulate de-
bate  on the  appropriateness  of the  tradi-
tional food stamp model and will generate
hypotheses which can be tested with more
recent data  (after  elimination  of the pur-
chase  requirement)  such  as  the  1979-80
supplemental  low  income  sample  to  the
USDA  Nationwide  Food  Consumption
Survey.
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